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The PAGA Saga
Tamar Meshel*

Abstract
Employees routinely enter into employment contracts that
contain arbitration agreements and prohibit them from bringing
class and/or representative actions. These employees may
therefore only bring claims against their employers, whether
contractual or statutory, in arbitration on an individual basis.
Such arbitration agreements and the class/representative action
waivers that they contain are enforced nationwide pursuant to the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). In California, however, a judgemade rule (the Iskanian rule) prohibits the enforcement of
representative action waivers found in arbitration agreements with
respect to employees’ claims of Labor Code violations under
California’s Private Attorney General Act (PAGA). A judicial
battle is currently raging between the state and the federal courts
in California concerning the tension between the FAA and PAGA
created by the Iskanian rule. This PAGA saga—the split between
the courts in California—is now before the United States Supreme
Court.
This Article examines the state and federal courts’ respective
interpretations of the Iskanian rule and discusses the weaknesses
in their approaches. The Article argues that unless the Supreme
Court reverses its long-standing course, the Court’s current
precedent leads to the invalidation of the Iskanian rule under both
the state and the federal judicial approaches because the rule is
preempted by the FAA. The impact of the Supreme Court’s
decision with respect to PAGA will likely be felt far beyond
California. The decision will be relevant to the interpretation and
application of the FAA more generally, as well as to other private
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attorney general statutes that might intersect with the FAA.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

A judicial battle is raging in the courts of California, one of many fought
in the war against the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 1 and one with
nationwide implications. The battle concerns a rule established by the
California Supreme Court in Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles,
LLC2 according to which waivers of representative actions brought by
employees pursuant to California’s Private Attorney General Act (PAGA) 3
are unenforceable (the Iskanian rule).4 PAGA authorizes an “aggrieved
employee” to bring a civil action against an employer “on behalf of himself
or herself and other current or former employees” for violation of any
provision of the Labor Code that provides for a “civil penalty” otherwise
collected by the Labor and Workforce Development Agency.5 Both state
and federal courts in California, as well as the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, agree that the Iskanian rule is not preempted
by the FAA. In other words, all California courts have held that waivers of
representative PAGA actions contained in arbitration agreements between
employers and employees are unenforceable and that this does not violate
the FAA or undermine its objectives.
State and federal courts in California have divided, however, on whether
1. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16.
2. Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348, 360 (2014), cert. denied,
574 U.S. 1121 (2015) (“[A]n arbitration agreement requiring an employee as a condition of
employment to give up the right to bring representative PAGA actions in any forum is contrary to
public policy.”).
3. Cal. Lab. Code §§ 2698–2699.8.
4. Employees routinely enter standard form employment contracts that contain arbitration
agreements. These agreements typically provide that “any and all claims” arising out of the
employment relationship, or similar language to the same effect, must be submitted to arbitration. In
addition, these employment arbitration agreements increasingly prohibit employees from bringing
class and/or representative actions in arbitration, known as class/representative action waivers. This
means that employees may only bring claims against their employers, whether contractual or
statutory, in arbitration on an individual basis.
5. Cal. Lab. Code § 2699. The “private attorney general doctrine” is “[t]he equitable principle
that allows the recovery of attorney’s fees to a party who brings a lawsuit that benefits a significant
number of people, requires private enforcement, and is important to society as a whole.” PrivateAttorney-General Doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). For general commentary
on the doctrine, see, e.g., Gilbert Paul Carrasco, Public Wrongs, Private Rights: Private Attorneys
General for Civil Rights, 9 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 321 (1998); Hannah L. Buxbaum, The Private
Attorney General in a Global Age: Public Interests in Private International Antitrust Litigation, 26
YALE J. INT’L L. 219 (2001); William B. Rubenstein, On What A “Private Attorney General” Is—
And Why It Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129 (2004); Trevor W. Morrison, Private Attorneys General
and the First Amendment, 103 MICH. L. REV. 589 (2005).

39

[Vol. 2021: 36]

The PAGA Saga
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

the Iskanian rule prohibits only the waiver of representative PAGA claims or
also their arbitration. On one side of the battlefield stand the California
state courts. These courts have unanimously and consistently held that
representative PAGA claims not only cannot be waived but also cannot be
arbitrated in most cases.6 On the opposite side of the battlefield stand the
United States district courts in California and the Ninth Circuit. These
courts have held that representative PAGA claims, while unwaivable, can
nonetheless be resolved in arbitration.7 After several unsuccessful attempts,
the Supreme Court has now granted certiorari to resolve this split between
the state and federal courts in California.8
To understand the PAGA saga—the tension between PAGA and the
FAA—one must examine the broader context of the Supreme Court’s FAA
jurisprudence.9 Almost forty years ago, the Court held that the FAA creates
“a substantive rule applicable in state as well as federal courts” that
“foreclose[s] state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of
arbitration agreements.”10 Twenty years ago, the Court held that the FAA
applies to arbitration clauses contained in employment contracts affecting
interstate commerce.11 A decade later, the Court held that the “saving
clause” in Section 2 of the FAA12 “permits agreements to arbitrate to be

6. Correia v. NB Baker Elec., Inc., 32 Cal. App. 5th 602, 621 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019) (stating that
California Courts of Appeals have “uniformly held that an employee’s predispute agreement to
arbitrate PAGA claims is not enforceable without the state’s consent”).
7. Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail N. Am., Inc., 803 F.3d 425, 431–32 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that
the rule did not prohibit arbitration of PAGA claims).
8. See, e.g., Betancourt v. Prudential Overall Supply, 9 Cal. App. 5th 439 (2017), cert. denied,
138 S. Ct. 556 (2017); Provost v. YourMechanic, Inc., 55 Cal. App. 5th 982 (2020), cert. denied,
141 S. Ct. 2891 (2021); Rivas v. Coverall North America, Inc., 842 Fed. Appx. 55 (9th Cir. 2021),
cert. filed, Aug. 20, 2021 (No. 21-268). On December 15, 2021, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Moriana v. Viking River Cruises, Inc., 2020 WL 5584508 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 18,
2020), cert. granted, 142 S. Ct. 734 (2012). There, “[t]he question presented [for certiorari is
[w]hether the Federal Arbitration Act requires enforcement of a bilateral arbitration agreement
providing that an employee cannot raise representative claims, including under PAGA.” Petition for
Writ of Certiorari, Viking River Cruises, Inc., 142 S. Ct. 734.
9. For a critique of this jurisprudence, see, e.g., J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the
Erosion of Substantive Law, 124 YALE L. J. 3052 (2015); Stephanie Greene & Christine Neylon
O’Brien, New Battles and Battlegrounds for Mandatory Arbitration After Epic Systems, New Prime,
and Lamps Plus, 56 AM. BUS. L. J. 815 (2019).
10. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984).
11. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 121 (2001). However, the FAA does not
apply to employment contracts of workers engaged in interstate transportation., as per Section 1.
12. The “saving clause” in Section 2 of the FAA provides that arbitration agreements “shall be
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
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invalidated by ‘generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress,
or unconscionability,’ but not by defenses that apply only to arbitration or
that derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at
issue.”13 Moreover, the Court held that even “generally applicable contract
defenses” would be preempted by the FAA if they “stand as an obstacle to
the accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives.”14 Specifically, the Court held
that requiring parties to conduct arbitration on a class basis where they have
agreed to individual arbitration is such an “obstacle.”15 In short, the FAA
preempts state law, including in the employment context, that directly
targets arbitration agreements or indirectly undermines the FAA’s
objectives, for instance by rendering waivers of class actions unenforceable,
“even if [the state law] is desirable for unrelated reasons.”16
As noted above, both state and federal courts in California agree that the
Iskanian rule, which prohibits waivers of representative PAGA actions, is
not preempted by the FAA.17 However, these courts have diverged in their
interpretation of the rule and the reasons for its survival from FAA
preemption. This split in approach has in turn led the state and the federal
courts to contradictory conclusions regarding the arbitrability of
representative PAGA claims under the Iskanian rule.
According to the state courts, the Iskanian rule is not preempted by the
FAA because it falls outside the Act’s scope.18 The FAA applies only to
disputes arising between parties to private contracts, while in a PAGA action
the real party in interest is not the employee who entered into the private
arbitration agreement but rather the state, a non-party to that agreement.19
Thus, the FAA does not apply to PAGA claims at all and cannot preempt the
Iskanian rule. In addition, the state courts have reasoned that because
PAGA claims are brought on behalf of the state and the state is not a party to
revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2.
13. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011) (referring to Section 2 of the
FAA).
14. Id. at 343.
15. Id. at 352.
16. Id. at 351.
17. Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348, 386–387 (Cal. 2014), cert. denied, 574
U.S. 1121 (2015); Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail North America, Inc., 803 F.3d 425, 439 (9th Cir.
2015).
18. See, e.g., Correia v. NB Baker Electric, Inc., 32 Cal. App. 5th 602, 625 n.3 (Cal. Ct. App.
2019) (commenting that PAGA actions “fall outside of the scope of the FAA.”)
19. Tanguilig v. Bloomingdale’s, Inc., 5 Cal. App. 5th 665, 671 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) (citing
Iskanian, 59 Cal. 4th at 384).
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any preexisting arbitration agreement signed by an individual employee,
such claims cannot be arbitrated (unless the state consents to do so).20 In the
California state courts, therefore, representative PAGA claims will almost
invariably be brought in court.
In contrast, the federal courts in California and the Ninth Circuit have
reasoned that the Iskanian rule is not preempted by the FAA because the rule
does not directly target arbitration agreements nor does it undermine the
objectives of the FAA.21 According to the federal courts, all that the
Iskanian rule purports to do is to render waivers of representative PAGA
claims unenforceable, and it does not prohibit the resolution of such claims
in arbitration as a matter of principle.22 In the federal courts, therefore,
representative PAGA claims may, at least in principle, be resolved in
arbitration. However, these courts have stopped short of compelling
arbitration where the parties’ agreement prohibits the arbitration of
“representative” claims, allowing PAGA claims to proceed in court instead.
This Article argues that the interpretation of the Iskanian rule by both
the state and the federal courts in California ultimately leads to its
preemption by the FAA under current Supreme Court precedent.23 The state
courts’ interpretation either places PAGA claims entirely outside the scope
of the FAA or renders such claims non-arbitrable in most cases. It thereby
“prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim,” triggering
FAA preemption.24 As for federal courts, their interpretation of the Iskanian
rule, while not as clearly in violation of the FAA, nonetheless ultimately
runs afoul of it. The federal courts’ reasoning leads to PAGA claims being
litigated in many cases notwithstanding an otherwise valid and applicable
arbitration agreement.
This outcome renders arbitration agreements
unenforceable and violates the FAA because it undermines “the enforcement
of arbitration agreements according to their terms.”25 At the end of the day,

20. Correia v. NB Baker Elec., Inc., 32 Cal. App. 5th at 621 (stating that “an employee’s
predispute agreement to arbitrate PAGA claims is not enforceable without the state’s consent”).
21. See Sakkab, 803 F.3d at 431–33 (9th Cir. 2015) (discussing whether the FAA preempts the
Iskanian rule).
22. Id.
23. See also Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, Unwaivable: Public Enforcement Claims and
Mandatory Arbitration, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 451, 454 (2020) (noting the “inevitable clash”
between California’s “jurisprudence holding public enforcement claims unwaivable in standard-form
contracts of adhesion” and the “Supreme Court’s interpretation of the FAA”).
24. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 341 (2011).
25. Id. at 343–44.
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the Supreme Court has held that a state “cannot require a procedure that is
inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable for unrelated reasons,” 26
including in the context of statutes giving rise to a private attorney general
role for individual plaintiffs such as the PAGA.27 Therefore, the fate of the
Iskanian rule, unless the Supreme Court reverses its long-standing course, is
FAA preemption.
Part I of the Article briefly introduces PAGA and its legislative
purpose.28 Part II explains the Iskanian rule, and Parts III and IV examine
state and federal courts’ interpretation of this rule, respectively.29 In Part V,
the Article discusses the weaknesses of the state and federal courts’
approaches and argues that both ultimately lead to the preemption of the
Iskanian rule by the FAA, at least under current Supreme Court precedent.30
Part VI of the Article concludes that the impact of the Supreme Court’s
decision on the Iskanian rule will likely extend beyond California—it will be
relevant to the interpretation and application of the FAA more generally, as
well as to other private attorney general statutes that might intersect with the
FAA. 31
II. PAGA
The California legislature enacted PAGA in 2004 to remedy two
problems associated with enforcing its Labor Code. First, many Labor Code
provisions did not have civil penalties or sanctions attached to them, and
their violation “rarely result[ed] in criminal investigations and
26. Id. at 351.
27. Shearson/American Exp., Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987) (noting that although
both RICO and antitrust plaintiffs have a private attorney general role, this does not render claims
brought under these federal statutes non-arbitrable).
28. See infra Part I. For a detailed discussion of PAGA, see, e.g., Matthew J. Goodman, The
Private Attorney General Act: How to Manage the Unmanageable, 56 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 413
(2016); Chris Micheli, Private Attorneys General Act Lawsuits in California: A Review of PAGA
and Proposals for Reforming the “Sue Your Boss” Law, 49 U. PAC. L. REV. 265 (2018). On the
positive impacts of PAGA see, e.g., Rachel Deutsch ET AL., California’s Hero Labor Law: The
Private Attorneys General Act Fights Wage Theft and Recovers Millions from Lawbreaking
Corporations, UCLA POLICY BRIEFS (Feb. 1, 2020), https://escholarship.org/uc/item/98f8556s. On
the negative impacts of PAGA, see, e.g., Ben Nicholson, Labor/Businesses Beware: Chapter 906
Deputizes 17 Million Private Attorneys General to Enforce the Labor Code, 35 MCGEORGE L. REV.
581 (2004).
29. See infra Part II–IV.
30. See infra Part V.
31. See infra Part VI.
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prosecutions.”32 PAGA overcame this problem by enacting significant civil
penalties for Labor Code violations. The second problem was a shortage of
government resources to pursue enforcement. PAGA remedied this issue by
allowing “aggrieved employees, acting as private attorneys general, to
recover civil penalties for Labor Code violations.”33 An “aggrieved
employee” is “any person who was employed by the alleged violator and
against whom one or more of the alleged violations was committed.”34
Aggrieved employees are authorized to “bring a civil action personally and
on behalf of other current or former employees.”35
Such a civil action may be filed if the Labor and Workforce
Development Agency decides not to investigate the employee’s complaint,
fails to respond to it within a prescribed period of time, or decides to
investigate the complaint but does not issue a citation.36 If the labor code
does not specify a penalty for a violation, the civil penalty under PAGA is
$100 “for each aggrieved employee per pay period for the initial violation”
and $200 “for each aggrieved employee per pay period for each subsequent
violation,”37 as well as reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.38 75% of the
civil penalties recovered in a PAGA action go to the Labor and Workforce
Development Agency and 25% to the aggrieved employees,39 making a
PAGA action “a type of qui tam action”40—“[a]n action brought under a
statute that allows a private person to sue for a penalty, part of which the
government or some specified public institution will receive.” 41

32. Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348, 379 (Cal. 2014), cert. denied, 574 U.S.
1121 (2015) (citing Sen. Judiciary Com., Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 796 (Reg. Sess. 2003–2004) as
amended Apr. 22, 2003, p.5).
33. Id.
34. Cal. Lab. Code § 2699(c).
35. Iskanian, 59 Cal. 4th at 380.
36. Cal. Lab. Code, § 2699.3(a).
37. Id. § 2699(f)(2).
38. Id. § 2699(g)(1).
39. In 2019, California recovered $88 million under PAGA. California’s Hero Labor Law: The
Private Attorneys General Act Fights Wage Theft and Recovers Millions from Lawbreaking
Corporations,
THE
PARTNERSHIP
FOR
WORKING
FAMILIES
(Feb.
11,
2020),
https://www.forworkingfamilies.org/resources/publications/california%E2%80%99s-hero-labor-lawprivate-attorneys-general-act-fights-wage-theft.
40. Iskanian, 59 Cal. 4th at 382.
41. Qui Tam Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
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III. ISKANIAN V. CLS TRANSPORTATION LOS ANGELES, LLC
In the Iskanian decision, the California Supreme Court held that waivers
of representative PAGA actions are unenforceable and that this rule, known
since then as the Iskanian rule, is not preempted by the FAA.
The plaintiff in this case was employed as a driver by the defendant (a
transportation company) from March 2004 to August 2005.42 In December
2004, the plaintiff signed an arbitration agreement providing that “any and
all claims” arising out of his employment were to be submitted to
arbitration.43 The arbitration agreement also contained a class and
representative action waiver.44 In August 2006, the plaintiff commenced an
action against the defendant for Labor Code violations.45 The defendant
successfully moved to compel arbitration and the plaintiff appealed. 46 While
the appeal was pending, the California Supreme Court decided in Gentry v.
Superior Court that “class arbitration waivers should not be enforced if a
trial court determines . . . that class arbitration would be a significantly more
effective way of vindicating the rights of affected employees than individual
arbitration.”47 The defendant then voluntarily withdrew its motion to
compel arbitration and the parties proceeded to litigate the case.48 The
plaintiff “brought his claims as an individual and putative class
representative seeking damages, and also in a representative capacity under
the PAGA seeking civil penalties.”49
In April 2011, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,50 which invalidated an earlier decision

42. Iskanian, 59 Cal. 4th at 360.
43. Id.
44. The waiver provided that “except as otherwise required under applicable law, (1)
EMPLOYEE and COMPANY expressly intend and agree that class action and representative action
procedures shall not be asserted, nor will they apply, in any arbitration pursuant to this
Policy/Agreement; (2) EMPLOYEE and COMPANY agree that each will not assert class action or
representative action claims against the other in arbitration or otherwise; and (3) each of
EMPLOYEE and COMPANY shall only submit their own, individual claims in arbitration and will
not seek to represent the interests of any other person.” Id. at 360–361.
45. Id. at 361.
46. Id.
47. Gentry v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 4th 443, 450 (Cal. 2007).
48. Iskanian, 59 Cal. 4th at 361.
49. Id.
50. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
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of the California Supreme Court, Discover Bank v. Superior Court.51 In
Discover Bank, the California Supreme Court prohibited class action
waivers in consumer arbitration agreements, which became known as the
Discover Bank rule.52 The United States Supreme Court held that the
Discover Bank rule was preempted by the FAA because requiring the
availability of classwide arbitration by holding class action waivers
unenforceable “interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration” and
“stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress.”53 The overarching purpose of the
FAA, according to the United States Supreme Court “is to ensure the
enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to
facilitate streamlined proceedings.”54 Since “class arbitration requires
procedural formality” and “greatly increases risks to defendants,” the United
States Supreme Court held that “class arbitration, to the extent it is
manufactured by Discover Bank rather than consensual, is inconsistent with
the FAA.”55 Moreover, a state cannot “require a procedure that is
inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable for unrelated reasons.”56
After Concepcion was issued, the defendant in Iskanian proceeded to
renew its motion to compel arbitration and dismiss the plaintiff’s class
claims, arguing that Concepcion also invalidated Gentry.57 The trial court
agreed, referring the case to individual arbitration and dismissing the class
claims, and the court of appeal affirmed.58 With respect to the plaintiff’s
representative PAGA claims, the court of appeal held that the FAA
51. Id. at 352.
52. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 4th 148, 162–63 (Cal. 2005). The rule established
by the California Supreme Court in this case, known as the Discover Bank rule, provided that “when
the waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in which disputes between the
contracting parties predictably involve small amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the
party with the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large
numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money, then . . . the waiver becomes in
practice the exemption of the party ‘from responsibility for [its] own fraud, or willful injury to the
person or property of another.’ (Civ. Code, § 1668.) Under these circumstances, such waivers are
unconscionable under California law and should not be enforced.” Id.
53. AT&T Mobility LLC, 563 U.S. at 344, 352 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61
(1941)).
54. Id. at 344.
55. Id. at 348–50.
56. Id. at 351.
57. Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348, 361 (Cal. 2014), cert. denied, 574 U.S.
1121 (2015).
58. Id.
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“precludes states from withdrawing claims from arbitration and that PAGA
claims must be argued individually, not in a representative action, according
to the terms of the arbitration agreement.”59
The plaintiff appealed to the California Supreme Court, and the court
answered two questions.60 The first question concerned the class action
waiver contained in the parties’ arbitration agreement and whether Gentry’s
refusal to enforce such a waiver was preempted by the FAA in light of
Concepcion.61 The court answered in the affirmative, noting that the United
States Supreme Court in Concepcion had held that the FAA “prevent[s]
states from mandating or promoting procedures incompatible with
arbitration” and that class proceedings were incompatible with arbitration.62
Therefore, pursuant to Concepcion “a class waiver is not invalid even if an
individual proceeding would be an ineffective means to prosecute certain
claims” and the contrary decision in Gentry could not stand.63
The second question before the California Supreme Court concerned the
representative, rather than class, action waiver contained in the arbitration
agreement as applied to the plaintiff’s PAGA claim.64 Specifically, whether
an employee’s right to bring a representative PAGA action was unwaivable
under California law and, if so, whether this was preempted by the FAA. 65
The court held that an employment agreement that eliminates employees’
right to bring a representative PAGA action “altogether” by way of a waiver
“before any dispute arises” is contrary to public policy because it serves “to
disable one of the primary mechanisms for enforcing the Labor Code.”66
Moreover, the court found that there was no difference in this respect
between “representative” and “individual” PAGA claims, because the
purposes of PAGA are not served where individual claims for Labor Code
violations are brought in many separate proceedings.67 Therefore, the court
concluded that where “an employment agreement compels the waiver of
representative claims under the PAGA, it is contrary to public policy and

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 362.
Id.
Id. at 364.
Id. at 364, 366.
Id. at 364.
Id. at 378.
Id.
Id. at 383.
Id. at 384.
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unenforceable as a matter of state law.”68
The court then proceeded to examine whether this prohibition on
waivers of representative PAGA actions is preempted by the FAA.69 The
court concluded that the rule is not preempted because it does not stand “as
an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives” within the
meaning of Concepcion.70 While the FAA “aims to ensure an efficient
forum for the resolution of private disputes,” the court reasoned, a PAGA
action “is a dispute between an employer and the state Labor and Workforce
Development Agency.”71 That the FAA was primarily intended to apply to
private contractual disputes is evident, according to the court, from its
reference to “[a] written provision . . . evidencing a transaction involving
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of
such contract or transaction.”72 Moreover, the FAA’s legislative history,
the court noted, shows that “the FAA’s primary object was the settlement of
ordinary commercial disputes” rather than “disputes between the
government in its law enforcement capacity and private individuals.”73
Accordingly, the court concluded that:
a PAGA claim lies outside the FAA’s coverage because it is not a
dispute between an employer and an employee arising out of their
contractual relationship. It is a dispute between an employer and
the state, which alleges directly or through its agents—either the
Labor and Workforce Development Agency or aggrieved
employees—that the employer has violated the Labor Code.74
Indeed, the court emphasized that in a PAGA claim, “the employee
plaintiff represents the same legal right and interest as state labor law
enforcement agencies” and that “an aggrieved employee’s action under the
[PAGA] functions as a substitute for an action brought by the government
itself.”75 In other words, a PAGA litigant is “the proxy or agent of the

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

48

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (referring to 9 U.S.C. § 2).
Id. at 385.
Id. at 386–87.
Id. at 387 (citing Arias v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 4th 969, 986 (Cal. 2009)).
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state[].”76 Therefore,
[r]epresentative actions under the PAGA, unlike class action suits
for damages, do not displace the bilateral arbitration of private
disputes between employers and employees over their respective
rights and obligations toward each other. Instead, they directly
enforce the state’s interest in penalizing and deterring employers
who violate California’s labor laws.77
The exception to FAA preemption established by the court was
ultimately framed in the following terms:
Our FAA holding applies specifically to a state law rule barring
predispute waiver of an employee’s right to bring an action that can
only be brought by the state or its representatives, where any
resulting judgment is binding on the state and any monetary
penalties largely go to state coffers.78
Since the court held that the parties’ arbitration agreement in this case
was enforceable other than with respect to the waiver of representative
PAGA actions, it directed the plaintiff to proceed with bilateral arbitration of
his individual damages claims and the defendant to answer the
representative PAGA claims “in some forum,” noting that “[t]he arbitration
agreement gives us no basis to assume that the parties would prefer to
resolve a representative PAGA claim through arbitration.”79
While the California Supreme Court in Iskanian clearly held that
waivers of representative PAGA claims are unenforceable and that the FAA
does not preempt this unenforceability, it was less clear whether arbitration
of such claims would be permissible. On the one hand, the court’s decision
seemed to only prohibit waivers of representative PAGA actions “in any

76. Id. at 388 (internal quotations omitted).
77. Id. at 387.
78. Id. at 388.
79. Id. at 391. The California Supreme Court remanded the case to address the following
questions: “(1) Will the parties agree on a single forum for resolving the PAGA claim and the other
claims? (2) If not, is it appropriate to bifurcate the claims, with individual claims going to
arbitration and the representative PAGA claim to litigation? (3) If such bifurcation occurs, should
the arbitration be stayed . . . ?” Id. at 391–92. Later, the employee successfully “filed a request to
dismiss both his individual claims (proceeding in arbitration) and his PAGA claims with prejudice.”
Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., LLC, 2016 WL 10706257, at *1 (Super. Ct. Cal. 2016).
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forum,”80 leaving the possibility of such actions proceeding “in some
forum,” including in arbitration, at least where the applicable arbitration
agreement so permits.81 The court also seemed to limit the prohibition on
waivers of representative PAGA actions to “predispute” agreements,
although it did not define this term.82 On the other hand, the decision could
also be read as prohibiting PAGA claims from proceeding in arbitration
altogether because of the court’s clear position that “the FAA aims to
promote arbitration of claims belonging to the private parties to an
arbitration agreement” and a representative PAGA claim is “a public
enforcement action” brought on behalf of the state.83 After all, if “a PAGA
claim lies outside the FAA’s coverage,”84 how could it ever be submitted to
FAA arbitration? And if it can never be submitted to arbitration, how can
the Iskanian rule escape FAA preemption for “prohibit[ing] outright the
arbitration of a particular type of claim”?85
Indeed, it seems that if Iskanian is read as holding that the FAA does not
apply to PAGA claims at all, it cannot survive FAA preemption under
Concepcion or, for that matter, under earlier Supreme Court precedent.86 As
a result, both state and federal courts in California have avoided interpreting
Iskanian in this way. As discussed in the next Part, state courts have limited
Iskanian’s holding to “predispute” arbitration agreements on the basis of
agency principles.87 Taking a different approach, as will be discussed in Part
IV, federal courts have restricted Iskanian’s holding to waivers of
representative PAGA claims, noting that Iskanian was silent on the
arbitration of such claims.88 In Part V, this Article will explain why both of
these approaches to the interpretation of the Iskanian rule ultimately violate
the FAA and result in the rule’s preemption, at least under current Supreme
80. Iskanian, 59 Cal. 4th at 360.
81. Id. at 391.
82. Id. at 388 (“Our FAA Holding applies specifically to a state law rule barring predispute
waiver of an employee’s right to bring an action.” (emphasis added)).
83. Id. at 388.
84. Id. at 386.
85. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 341 (2011).
86. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) (“Congress intended to foreclose state
legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements.”); Mastrobuono v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 58 (1995) (holding that the FAA ensures that arbitration
agreements are enforced according to their terms “even if a rule of state law would otherwise
exclude such claims from arbitration”).
87. See infra Part III.
88. See infra Part IV.
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Court jurisprudence.89
IV. CALIFORNIA STATE COURTS POST-ISKANIAN
Recognizing that Iskanian did not, in fact, “decide the issue of whether
courts have the authority to order a PAGA representative action into
arbitration,”90 state courts in all six California appellate districts have
nonetheless read Iskanian as prohibiting not only the predispute waiver of
representative PAGA claims but also their arbitration.91 Most of these
courts, however, have not relied on Iskanian for its conclusion that the FAA
as a whole is inapplicable to such claims. Instead, they have found that
particular arbitration agreements, namely “predispute” agreements, cannot
bind the state to arbitrate PAGA actions on the basis of agency principles. 92
The basic reasoning of the California state courts is as follows: even
though plaintiffs-employees are acting as proxies or agents of the state when
bringing a PAGA action, they cannot bind the state to an arbitration
agreement that they entered into “before any dispute has arisen.” 93 When an

89. See infra Part V.
90. Correia v. NB Baker Electric, Inc., 32 Cal. App. 5th 602, 609 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019). See also
Galarsa v. Dolgen California, LLC, 2021 WL 5411013, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021) (“Iskanian’s antiwaiver rule prevents employer from avoiding PAGA and does not directly address arbitration
agreements, private or otherwise.”).
91. See, e.g., Ely v. Walnut Creek Assocs. 2, Inc., 2019 WL 5654368, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019)
(“Iskanian exempted from arbitration those actions where the state is the real party in interest.”);
Esparza v. KS Indus., L.P., 13 Cal. App. 5th 1228, 1246 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017) (referring to the
Iskanian rule as a “rule of nonarbitrability”). Some California state courts prohibited arbitration of
representative PAGA claims pursuant to a “predispute” arbitration agreement but left open the
possibility of such arbitration taking place pursuant to a post-dispute agreement. See, e.g.,
Betancourt v. Prudential Overall Supply, 9 Cal. App. 5th 439, 448 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017) (“We have
not interpreted Iskanian as prohibiting arbitration of all PAGA claims. Hypothetically, a PAGA
plaintiff might consent to arbitration after the filing of a complaint.”).
92. Several courts have nonetheless noted or relied on Iskanian’s holding regarding the scope of
the FAA. See, e.g., Galarsa v. Dolgen California, LLC, 2021 WL 5411013, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App.
2021), where the court found that the PAGA waiver was not preempted by the FAA because “the
FAA cannot be frustrated when the matter in question lies outside its scope.” In Herrera v. Doctors
Medical Center of Modesto, 67 Cal. App. 5th 538, 542 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021), the court concluded that
“the FAA does not reach the PAGA claims alleged in this case,” while nonetheless recognizing that
PAGA claims are subject to arbitration “if the state, or the state’s authorized representative, consents
to arbitration.” In Correia v. NB Baker Electric, Inc., 32 Cal. App. 5th 602, 625 n.3 (Cal. Ct. App.
2019), the court noted in a footnote that “[b]ecause PAGA actions are public enforcement actions,
they generally fall outside the scope of the FAA,” but did not decide the case on this basis.
93. Correia, 32 Cal. App. 5th at 624. See also, e.g., Betancourt v. Prudential Overall Supply, 9
Cal. App. 5th 439, 446 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017) (“The state is not bound by [an employee’s] predispute
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arbitration agreement ceases to be “predispute”—i.e., when it will be
binding on the state even if entered into by an individual employee—is not
entirely clear. The state courts initially referred to the point in time when
plaintiff-employees qualify as “‘aggrieved employees’ entitled to bring the
PAGA action on the state’s behalf” as determinative of their status as agents
of the state capable of binding it to an arbitration agreement. 94 As already
noted, PAGA defines an “aggrieved employee” as “any person who was
employed by the alleged violator and against whom one or more of the
alleged violations was committed.”95 On its face, this definition does not
require employees to actually file a PAGA claim or to comply with any
procedural requirements in order to be considered “aggrieved employees.”
Nonetheless, state courts have not allowed “aggrieved employees” to
bind the state to arbitration agreements without more. Rather, they have
required that an aggrieved employee also meet the statutory procedural
requirements for commencing a PAGA action as set out in the Labor Code, 96
namely that the state “does not investigate, does not issue a citation, or fails
to respond to the notice within 65 days.”97 Only at that point, according to
these courts, has the state provided the employee “with implicit or explicit
authority to bring the claim,” so that the employee is capable of binding the
state to an arbitration agreement.98 The rationale is that until this occurs the
agreement to arbitrate.”); Herrera, 67 Cal. App. 5th at 549 (“[O]ur legal conclusion ‘that PAGA
representative claims for civil penalties are not subject to arbitration’ is necessarily limited to
arbitration pursuant to a predispute arbitration agreement.”); Contreras v. Superior Court of L.A,
Cnty., 61 Cal. App. 5th 461, 472 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021) (“[A]n employer cannot rely on an
employee’s predispute arbitration agreement to compel arbitration of a PAGA claim.” (internal
citations omitted)). The court expressly noted that “an agreement to arbitrate the PAGA claims
would not be enforceable unless it was made after the former employee became a PAGA authorized
aggrieved employee (i.e., an agent of the state).” Herrera, at 551 n.3.
94. Correia, 32 Cal. App. 5th at 622, 624 (“[U]nder the PAGA statutory scheme, the plaintiff
does not assume this proxy role until it is an ‘aggrieved employee.’”).
95. Cal. Lab. Code, § 2699(c).
96. California Labor Code § 2699.3(a) sets forth the procedures with which an aggrieved
employee must comply in order to commence a representative PAGA action.
97. Mondragon v. Santa Ana Healthcare & Wellness Ctr., LP, 2021 WL 4436388, at *7 n.3 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2021) (citing Kim v. Reins Int. Cal., Inc., 9 Cal. 5th 73, 81 (Cal. 2020)).
98. Correia, 32 Cal. App. 5th at 622. See also, e.g., Pote v. Handy Techs., Inc., 2021 WL
3615916, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Julian v. Glenair, Inc., 17 Cal. App. 5th 853, 866
(2017). The court found that the arbitration agreement was entered into by the plaintiff-employee
“predispute” notwithstanding that it was concluded after the employee provided his PAGA notice to
the employer and the state agency. Some state courts have also held that no part of a PAGA claim
may be submitted to arbitration pursuant to a “predispute” agreement, including the question of
whether the plaintiff-employee is an “aggrieved employee” within the meaning of PAGA. See, e.g.,
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state “retains control of the right underlying the employee’s PAGA claim,” 99
and therefore the employee can only conclude the arbitration agreement “as
an individual, rather than as an agent or representative of the state” 100 and
the agreement cannot bind the state.101 Nor can theories such as
assumption102 and equitable estoppel103 result in a “predispute” arbitration
agreement binding the state.
According to the state courts, this reasoning is consistent with other qui
tam statutes that prohibit the enforcement of an arbitration agreement
entered into by an individual against the non-party state and with the legal
principle that “a person who signs an agreement in a particular capacity is
not necessarily bound when acting in a different capacity.”104 Nor is this
reasoning displaced by the United State Supreme Court’s decisions in Epic
Systems Corp. v. Lewis105 and Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela.106 In Epic
Systems, the Supreme Court held that the National Labor Relations Act
should not be read as prohibiting waivers of class actions in employment
contracts because such a prohibition would attack “(only) the individualized
Williams v. Superior Court of L.A. Cnty., 237 Cal. App. 4th 642, 649 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015); Provost
v. YourMechanic, Inc., 55 Cal. App. 5th 982, 987–988 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct.
2891 (2021) and cases cited therein at 994.
99. Correia, 32 Cal. App. 5th at 622–23.
100. Julian v. Glenair Inc., 17 Cal. App. 5th 853, 872 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017). See also, e.g., Collie
v. Icee Co., 52 Cal. App. 5th 477, 482 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020).
101. Ahlmann v. ForwardLine Fin., LLC, 2021 WL 5275771, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021). See
also, e.g., Betancourt v. Prudential Overall Supply, 9 Cal. App. 5th 439, 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017)
(“[T]he fact that [the employee] may have entered into a predispute agreement to arbitrate does not
bind the state to arbitration.”); Collie, 52 Cal. App. 5th at 483 (concluding that the employee’s
“predispute arbitration agreement is unenforceable” because the employer “cannot enforce a
contractual provision to bind a nonparty”).
102. Galarsa v. Dolgen California, LLC, 2021 WL 5411013, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021) (holding
that mere inaction on behalf of the state in not commencing a PAGA action against an employer
after receiving a complaint from an employee does not constitute assumption of the employee’s preexisting arbitration agreement).
103. Id. at *9 (noting that since a PAGA cause of action concerns alleged violations of the Labor
Code, such statutory violations do not depend upon the underlying employment contract containing
the arbitration agreement. Therefore, in order to successfully argue equitable estoppel, a plaintiffemployee would have to rely on “a particular provision of the employment agreement . . . to
establish a Labor Code violation.” (original emphasis omitted)).
104. Correia, 32 Cal. App. 5th at 622–23 (referring to the federal False Claims Act (31 U.S.C.
§ 3729 et seq. and quoting Mikes v. Strauss, 889 F. Supp. 746, 755 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) and United
States ex rel. Welch v. My Left Foot Children’s Therapy, LLC, 2016 U.S. Dist. Lexis 76490 (D. Nev.
2016).
105. See generally Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
106. See generally Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407 (2019).
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nature of the arbitration proceedings,” thereby seeking “to interfere with one
of arbitration’s fundamental attributes.”107 In Lamps Plus, the Supreme
Court held that “[c]ourts may not infer from an ambiguous agreement that
parties have consented to arbitrate on a classwide basis” because “[c]lass
arbitration is not only markedly different from the ‘traditional individualized
arbitration’ contemplated by the FAA, it also undermines the most important
benefits of that familiar form of arbitration.”108 The California state courts
have uniformly held that the Iskanian rule (which, according to these courts,
prohibits both waivers of representative PAGA claims and most agreements
to arbitrate such claims) remains un-preempted by the FAA notwithstanding
these recent United States Supreme Court decisions.109 As one California
state court of appeal has summarized:
[A]n aggrieved employee’s pursuit of a PAGA action in a judicial forum
does not frustrate the FAA’s “principal purpose of ensuring that private
arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms” any more than
the Labor and Workforce Development Agency’s pursuit of the PAGA
claim in court would frustrate the FAA. [T]he class action claim pursued in
Epic Systems “differs fundamentally from a PAGA claim” because a PAGA
claim is brought on behalf of the state, not on behalf of other employees. 110
V. FEDERAL COURTS IN CALIFORNIA AND THE NINTH CIRCUIT POSTISKANIAN
In contrast to the state courts, federal courts in California have
interpreted Iskanian narrowly as prohibiting only the complete waiver of
representative PAGA claims and have therefore purported to allow for such
claims to proceed in arbitration. For present purposes, this line of authority
begins with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail North

107. Epic Systems Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1622.
108. Lamps Plus, Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1415–19.
109. See, e.g., Collie v. Icee Company, 52 Cal. App. 5th 477, 483 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020); Correia,
32 Cal. App. 5th at 619–620; Olson v. Lyft, Inc., 56 Cal. App. 5th 862, 872 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020);
Malaspina v. Maplebear Inc., 2021 WL 3561359, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021); Mondragon v. Santa
Ana Healthcare & Wellness Ctr., LP, 2021 WL 4436388, at *5–6 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021); Winns v.
Postmates Inc., 66 Cal. App. 5th 803, 811 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021).
110. Galarsa v. Dolgen California, LLC, 2021 WL 5411013, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting
Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. Bd. of Tr. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989) and
Correia v. NB Baker Electric, Inc., 32 Cal.App.5th 602, 619 (2019)).
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America, Inc.111
Sakkab involved an employee who filed a putative class action against
his employer as well as a representative claim for civil penalties under
PAGA. 112 The employer moved to compel individual arbitration pursuant to
the parties’ arbitration agreement, which contained a class and representative
action waiver.113 The district court, rendering its decision prior to Iskanian,
granted the employer’s motion to compel individual arbitration and the
employee appealed.114 Iskanian was rendered in the interim, and the
question presented to the Ninth Circuit in Sakkab was whether the FAA
preempted the Iskanian rule barring the waiver of representative PAGA
claims.115
The Ninth Circuit answered this question in the negative. The court first
found that the Iskanian rule applies to “any contract” as required under the
“saving clause” of Section 2 of the FAA116 because it “bars any waiver of
PAGA claims, regardless of whether the waiver appears in an arbitration
agreement or a non-arbitration agreement.”117 Therefore, the Iskanian rule
does not target arbitration agreements specifically in violation of the FAA.
The Ninth Circuit then reasoned that the Iskanian rule also does not conflict
with the FAA’s two purposes.118 First, the FAA was intended to “overcome
judicial hostility to arbitration.”119 The Ninth Circuit found that this purpose
does not conflict with the Iskanian rule, because the rule “provides only that
representative PAGA claims may not be waived outright” and “does not
prohibit the arbitration of any type of claim.”120
Second, the FAA was intended to “‘ensur[e] that private arbitration
agreements are enforced according to their terms.’”121 The Ninth Circuit
found that this purpose does not conflict with the Iskanian rule either

111. See generally Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail North America, Inc., 803 F.3d 425 (9th Cir. 2015).
112. Id. at 428.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 429.
116. The “saving clause” of Section 2 of the FAA provides that arbitration agreements “shall be
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2.
117. Sakkab, 803 F.3d at 432.
118. Id. at 433.
119. Id. at 434.
120. Id.
121. Id. (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011)).
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because the rule “does not diminish parties’ freedom to select informal
arbitration procedures” as a ban on class action waivers does.122 A class
action, according to the court, is “a procedural device for resolving the
claims of absent parties on a representative basis.”123 In contrast, a
representative PAGA action is a “statutory action for penalties” brought “as
the proxy or agent of the state’s labor law enforcement agencies.”124 By
bringing a representative PAGA action to obtain civil penalties for an
employer’s Labor Code violations, the employee-plaintiff “does not
vindicate absent employees’ claims.”125 Therefore, there is no need to
protect such employees’ “due process rights in PAGA arbitrations” and such
arbitrations “do not require the formal procedures of class arbitrations.”126
The Ninth Circuit emphasized that it is a “critically important distinction”
between the Iskanian rule and the Discover Bank rule invalidated by the
Supreme Court in Concepcion that “[n]othing prevents parties from agreeing
to use informal procedures to arbitrate representative PAGA claims.”127
Finding the Iskanian rule was not preempted by the FAA, the Ninth
Circuit held that the waiver of the employee’s representative PAGA claim in
this case could not be enforced and remanded the case to the district court to
determine where this claim should be resolved—in arbitration (together with
the employee’s non-PAGA claims) or in litigation.128
In subsequent decisions, the Ninth Circuit continued to diverge from the
California state courts’ jurisprudence. The court repeatedly affirmed that
PAGA claims may be compelled to arbitration in accordance with the terms
of preexisting arbitration agreements entered into by individual employees

122. Id. at 435.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 435–36 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Iskanian, 59 Cal. 4th at 380).
125. Id. at 435.
126. Id. at 436. Such formal requirements include notice to unnamed aggrieved employees, optout options for such employees, class counsel’s ability to fairly and adequately represent unnamed
employees, and numerosity, commonality, or typicality. Id.
127. Id. The Ninth Circuit noted that “the amount of civil penalties the PAGA authorizes could
make arbitration a less attractive method than litigation for resolving representative PAGA claims,”
but found that this was insufficient for a finding that the FAA preempts the Iskanian rule. Id. at 437.
The court further accepted that PAGA actions are “complex” but noted that there are not
“necessarily ‘procedurally’ complex.” Id. at 438. The court cautioned, however, that a state law
limiting parties’ right to use informal procedures “could run afoul of the Court’s decision in
Concepcion by requiring a degree of formality that is inconsistent with traditional arbitration
procedures.” Id. at 439.
128. Id. at 440. No further proceedings took place before the district court.

56

[Vol. 2021: 36]

The PAGA Saga
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

and employers because this does not “run afoul of Sakkab and Iskanian.”129
Iskanian, according to the Ninth Circuit, “does not require that a PAGA
claim be pursued in the judicial forum; it holds only that a complete waiver
of the right to bring a PAGA claim is invalid.”130 Because a plaintiffemployee bringing a PAGA claim acts as an agent or proxy of the state and
the judgment in a representative PAGA action is also binding on the state,
the plaintiff-employee “can agree to pursue a PAGA claim in arbitration.”131
More in line with the California state courts, the Ninth Circuit has also
rejected the argument that Sakkab and Iskanian have been overruled by the
United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Epic Systems132 and Lamps
Plus.133 According to the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court in these cases
simply “reiterated and reapplied,” but did not expand the Concepcion rule
that the FAA “preempts state laws that interfere with arbitration’s
‘fundamental attributes,’ including, primarily, its procedural informality.” 134
A long line of California federal district court decisions has faithfully
applied the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the Iskanian rule. These courts
have refused to enforce waivers of representative PAGA claims contained in
arbitration agreements and have either compelled such claims to
arbitration135 or stayed them pending the arbitration of other arbitrable
claims.136
129. Wulfe v. Valero Refining Co.-California, 641 Fed. App’x 758, 760 (9th Cir. 2016). Whether
a PAGA claim may be compelled to arbitration in turn depends on whether it falls within the scope
of the arbitration clause. Valdez v. Terminix Int’l Co. Ltd. P’ship, 681 Fed. App’x 592, 594 (9th
Cir. 2017).
130. Valdez, 681 Fed. App’x at 594.
131. Id.
132. Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
133. Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407 (2019).
134. Rivas v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 842 Fed. App’x 55, 56 (9th Cir. 2021).
135. See, e.g., Orozco v. Gruma Corp., 2021 WL 4481061, at *6 (E.D. Cal. 2021) (noting that the
court did not mention the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Sakkab and instead referred to Porter v. Nabros
Drilling USA, L.P., 2015 WL 13323135, *2 (E.D. Cal. 2015), issued a week before Sakkab, in which
the district court concluded that “the FAA preempts the rule announced in Iskanian . . . [the]
undisputed waiver of the right to bring a representative or class action is enforceable.”); Burmudez
v. Dragados USA, Inc., 2021 WL 5417658, at *6 (E.D. Cal. 2021) (noting that “[w]hile the law at
issue is slightly muddled,” plaintiff’s “categorical statement” that “PAGA claims cannot be
compelled to arbitration under California law” is “not correct,” and ordering arbitration of the
plaintiff’s PAGA claims on an individual basis).
136. See, e.g., Cardenas v. Aaron’s, Inc., 2021 WL 2355942, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 2021)
(“[C]onsidering the derivative nature of Plaintiff’s PAGA claim, the Court exercises its discretion
and stays the entire action pending arbitration of Plaintiff’s individual claims in the interest of
judicial efficiency.”); Bell v. Redfin Corp., 2021 WL 5444791, at *5 (S.D. Cal. 2021) (“[B]ecause
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VI. THE ISKANIAN RULE—PREEMPTED BY THE FAA AFTER ALL?
As the previous two Parts demonstrate, federal and state courts in
California diverge on the scope of the Iskanian rule.137 Specifically, the
courts disagree on whether it prohibits only waivers of representative PAGA
claims that would prevent such claims from proceeding “in any forum” (as
per the federal courts), or also prohibits such claims from proceeding in
arbitration, at least pursuant to a “predispute” agreement entered into by an
individual employee (as per the state courts). While both state and federal
courts have thus far agreed that the FAA does not preempt the Iskanian rule,
they also differ on the rationale underlying this conclusion. According to the
state courts, the FAA does not preempt the Iskanian rule because PAGA
claims are brought by employees as agents on behalf of the state and an
individual employee cannot bind the state to a “predispute” arbitration
agreement.138 According to the federal courts, the FAA does not preempt
the Iskanian rule because the rule applies to any contract and does not
undermine the objectives of the FAA.139 This Part of the Article argues that,
despite the efforts of the state and federal courts in California to avoid FAA
preemption of the Iskanian rule, both lines of authority ultimately foreclose
arbitration of a particular category of claims and therefore cannot escape
the PAGA claims and the arbitrable claims are interconnected, efficiency counsels in favor of a
stay.”); Musolf v. NRC Env’t Servs., Inc., 2021 WL 1696282, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 2021) (“Given the
entanglement of the non-arbitrable PAGA claim for civil penalties with the other claims for damages
. . . the court stays the entire action here in the interests of efficiency, pending completion of
arbitration.”); Gonzales v. Emeritus Corp., 407 F. Supp. 3d 862, 868 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“[B]ecause
plaintiff’s PAGA claims are derivative of the substantive claims which will proceed to arbitration,
the representative PAGA claims are hereby [stayed] pending the results of the arbitration
proceeding.”); Maharaj v. Charter Commc’n, Inc., 2021 WL 5014352, at *11 (S.D. Cal. 2021)
(“[W]here, as here, the factual and legal overlap between arbitrable wage-and-hour claims and
nonarbitrable PAGA claims is considerable, courts are well-within their discretion to stay the PAGA
claims pending arbitration of the individual claims, as it would serve the Court's interest in
efficiency and give proper effect both to the principles enshrined in Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and the parties’ agreement to arbitrate.”). But see Harper v. Charter Commc’n,
LLC, 2021 WL 4784417, at *10 (E.D. Cal. 2021) (refusing to stay the plaintiff’s PAGA claims
“because a stay would impede vindication of California’s interests in enforcing the Labor Code
through representative PAGA actions . . . and because the PAGA claim represents a distinct ‘action’
in this case”).
137. See supra Part III–IV.
138. See Tanguiilig v. Bloomingdale’s, Inc., 5 Cal. App. 665, 678 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) (stating
that PAGA plaintiffs act as a proxy for the state).
139. See Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail North America, Inc., 803 F.3d 425, 432 (9th Cir. 2015)
(holding that the FAA does not preempt Iskanian because it does not conflict with the FAA’s
objectives).
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preemption under current United States Supreme Court jurisprudence.140
A. The State Courts’ Rationale Leads to Preemption
Recall that the California Supreme Court in Iskanian held that the
newly-established rule rendering representative PAGA waivers
unenforceable survives FAA preemption because the FAA is not applicable
to PAGA claims at all.141 Therefore, if Iskanian is read as prohibiting
arbitration of PAGA claims because such claims fall outside the scope of the
FAA, this prohibition would apply to all arbitration agreements entered into
by employees at any point in time, including after they have become agents
of the state for the purpose of brining a PAGA claim.142 Such a rule would
prohibit “outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim,” clearly
resulting in FAA preemption.143
Indeed, by seemingly allowing employees to bind the state to “postdispute” arbitration agreements with respect to PAGA claims, the lower state
courts have effectively rejected a reading of Iskanian as categorically
prohibiting arbitration of such claims. However, the result of the approach
adopted by the lower state courts is no less damning to arbitration
agreements.144 These courts have held that an aggrieved employee can only
bind the state to an arbitration agreement after all of the procedural
requirements for the employee to bring a PAGA claim are satisfied. 145 But
140. See infra Section V.A–V.B.
141. Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348, 386–87 (Cal. 2014), cert. denied, 574
U.S. 1121 (2015).
142. See Green v. Shipt, Inc., 2021 WL 4901523, at *6 n.6 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021) (“Iskanian’s
underlying public policy rationale does not turn on how the employer and worker entered into the
agreement, or its mandatory or voluntary nature. Rather, it turns on the fact that a PAGA claim
provides a remedy that inures to the state and that private agreements seeking to waive such public
rights are precluded.” (citing Winns v. Postmates Inc., 66 Cal. App. 5th 803, 810–11 (Cal. Ct. App.
2021); Provost v. YourMechanic Inc., 55 Cal. App. 5th 982, 993–94 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020); Williams
v. Superior Court, 237 Cal. App. 4th. 642, 647–48 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015)).
143. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 341 (2011). This was recognized by
Justices Chin and Baxter’s concurring opinion in Iskanian, finding that the majority’s decision that
“the FAA completely inapplicable to PAGA” was “a novel theory, devoid of case law support.”
Iskanian, 59 Cal.4th at 396 (Chin and Baxter, JJ., concurring).
144. Diaz v. First Class Vending, Inc., 2020 WL 563904, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020) (noting that
where “parties have agreed to arbitrate PAGA claims . . . such claims might still avoid arbitration on
California public policy grounds under Iskanian, even where the FAA applies”).
145. Pote v. Handy Tech., Inc., 2021 WL 3615916, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021) (“The
predispute/postdispute boundary is crossed when the pertinent employee is authorized to commence
a PAGA action as an agent of the state.” (quoting Julian v. Glenair, Inc., 17 Cal. App. 5th 853, 870
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even this threshold has been increasingly pushed by the courts to the point of
turning practically all arbitration agreements entered into by individual
employees into “predispute” agreements that are incapable of binding the
state to arbitration of PAGA claims.
For instance, one state court held that even if a plaintiff-employee
chooses not to opt-out of a previously concluded arbitration agreement after
all of the procedural requirements for bringing a PAGA claim are satisfied,
the arbitration agreement still cannot apply to PAGA claims. 146 The court
reasoned that the employee had originally entered into the arbitration
agreement “in his individual capacity only. His corresponding right to opt
out of the arbitration agreement was similarly an individual one.”147 In other
words, an employee can only bind the state to an arbitration agreement as its
agent if the agreement is entered into after all procedural requirements for
bringing a PAGA action have been met by that employee. This would
require an independent arbitration agreement between the employer and the
employee that is separate from the original employment contract and
concluded at the time that the employee is commencing the PAGA action,
which is very unlikely to happen.
Therefore, if the state courts’ reasoning is taken to its logical conclusion,
then many valid arbitration agreements entered into by employers and
employees will not be enforced with respect to PAGA actions. These
include, for instance, an arbitration agreement entered into “predispute” that
the plaintiff-employee reaffirms in some way “post-dispute,” an agreement
to arbitrate future PAGA claims on a representative basis (i.e., there is no
waiver of such claims “in any forum”), and a “predispute” arbitration
agreement contained in an employment contract with a severability clause
allowing a court to sever the offending representative PAGA waiver and
enforce the arbitration agreement.148 Indeed, it is difficult to imagine an
(Cal. Ct. App. 2017)).
146. Pote, 2021 WL 3615916 at *10.
147. Id. at *9. The arbitration agreement in this case waived representative actions and the
employer sought to arbitrate the employee’s PAGA claims on an individual basis. Id. at *1. It is
unclear whether the court would have compelled the claims to arbitration on a representative basis
had the arbitration agreement so permitted.
148. See, e.g., Correia v. NB Baker Electric, Inc., 32 Cal. App. 5th 602, 621 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019)
(finding that the court was “satisfied that the parties agreed (through the agreement’s severance
clause) that if any provision (such as the representative claim waiver in all forums) is found to be
invalid, the finding does not preclude the enforcement of any remaining portion of the agreement”)
Nonetheless, the Correia court held that the agreement to arbitrate a PAGA representative action
was unenforceable. Id. at 624–25.
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employment arbitration agreement that would satisfy the state courts’
increasingly demanding definition of a “post-dispute” agreement.
The state courts’ reasoning may also implicate employment arbitration
agreements beyond representative PAGA claims. For instance, in some
cases plaintiffs-employees included in a PAGA action victim-specific
remedies in addition to civil penalties,149 which if accepted would allow
them to circumvent entirely the arbitration agreement they would otherwise
be bound by in bringing individual claims. In other cases, plaintiffsemployees filed a single cause of action pursuant to PAGA, 150 at times

149. In ZB, N.A. v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 5th 175 (Cal. 2019), the California Supreme Court
clarified what relief employees could claim in a PAGA action. At issue in ZB was section 558 of the
Labor Code, which contemplates civil penalties for unpaid wages. Id. at 181. Section 558 “lacks a
private right of action” and “[a]n aggrieved employee can make use of section 558’s remedy only
when she acts as the state’s proxy—and that’s a role she can play only through a PAGA action.” Id.
at 188. However, the California Supreme Court concluded that “the amount for unpaid wages
referenced in section 558 is not part of that section’s civil penalty and is not recoverable through a
PAGA action.” Id. Rather, it “represents compensatory damages” that may be recovered by an
employee in other ways. Id. According to the court, an action for “civil penalties” under the PAGA
is “fundamentally a law enforcement action designed to protect the public and not to benefit private
parties” and such civil penalties are “additional to actual losses incurred” that are “intended ‘to
punish the employer’ for wrongdoing.” Id. at 185–86 (internal citations omitted). In contrast,
“[s]tatutory damages . . . primarily seek to compensate employees for actual losses incurred,” such
as unpaid wages. Id. at 186 (internal citations omitted). Therefore, “[p]ursuing civil penalties does
not prevent an employee from separately or concurrently pursuing unpaid wages and other remedies
already available to her.” Id. at 187. In other words, while “[a]n employee’s predispute agreement
to individually arbitrate her claims is unenforceable where it blocks an employee’s PAGA claim
from proceeding,” a PAGA claim does not include all possible remedies under the Labor Code. Id.
at 198. The court ultimately upheld the Court of Appeal’s decision to deny the employer’s motion to
compel arbitration, however it did so because the employee lacked a cause of action under section
558. Id. Notwithstanding the California Supreme Court’s holding in ZB, some plaintiff-employees
attempt to present individual claims or claims for victim-specific relief as PAGA claims or as part of
a PAGA action. See, e.g., McCray v. Wireless World, LLC, 2019 WL 6123766, at *4, 7 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2019) (holding that although the plaintiffs-employees described their lawsuit as a “PAGA-only
representative action,” their “sole cause of action contain[ed] numerous allegations supporting nonPAGA individual claims, and correspondingly their prayer s[ought] relief that is unavailable in a
representative action under PAGA”; therefore, “any claims for ‘individualized (i.e., victim-specific)
relief’ are unaffected by Iskanian and should be resolved by arbitration”); Ely v. Walnut Creek
Assoc. 2, Inc., 2019 WL 5654368, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019) (stating that the plaintiff-employee
brought claims under PAGA for underpaid wages under section 558); Diaz v. First Class Vending,
Inc., 2020 WL 563904, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020) (stating that the plaintiff-employee brought claims
under PAGA for underpaid wages under section 558); Pote v. Handy Tech., Inc., 2021 WL 3615916,
at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021) (stating that the plaintiff-employee originally filed PAGA representative
claims seeking civil penalties, including unpaid wages, but later removed the claim for unpaid wages
pursuant to ZB).
150. See, e.g., Betancourt v. Prudential Overall Supply, 9 Cal. App. 5th 439, 442 (Cal. Ct. App.
2017); Contreras v. Superior Court of L.A. Cnty., 61 Cal. App. 5th 461, 466 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021);
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amending their original complaint to remove any individual or class
claims.151 This is not surprising. Aggrieved employees stand to receive
25% of what could be a hefty civil penalty,152 PAGA claims “might be easier
to prove than common law claims,”153 and employees may then, “by
invoking collateral estoppel, use the judgment against the employer to obtain
remedies other than civil penalties for the same Labor Code violations.” 154
Therefore, there may be strategic advantages to bringing a single PAGA
cause of action instead of an action for victim-specific damages, including
avoiding individual arbitration.155
So, while the California state courts have not read Iskanian as outright
prohibiting arbitration of PAGA claims, a reading that would clearly be
preempted by the FAA, they have applied an increasingly higher threshold
for an arbitration agreement to qualify as a “post-dispute” agreement that
could bind the state. Therefore, the state courts’ reasoning has the same
ultimate effect as if they had directly prohibited arbitration of representative
PAGA claims—practically no PAGA claim will be arbitrated. Because this
outcome frustrates the objectives of the FAA as articulated by the United
States Supreme Court, the state courts’ reasoning cannot save the Iskanian
rule from preemption.
Nor, it seems, can the qui tam nature of PAGA save Iskanian from its
Collie v. Icee Co., 52 Cal. App. 5th 477, 479 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020); Ahlmann v. Forwardline Fin.,
LLC, 2021 WL 5275771, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021); Mondragon v. Santa Ana Healthcare &
Wellness Ctr., LP, 2021 WL 4436388, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021); Williams v. RGIS, LLC, 70 Cal.
App. 5th 445, 448 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021); Provost v. YourMechanic, Inc., 55 Cal. App. 5th 982, 987
(Cal. Ct. App. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2891 (2021).
151. See, e.g., Green v. Shipt, Inc., 2021 WL 4901523, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021) (stating that the
plaintiff-employee “amended her complaint to dismiss her individual and class claims, leaving only
a single cause of action for civil penalties under the PAGA”); Malaspina v. Maplebear Inc., 2021
WL 3561359, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021) (stating that the plaintiff-employee amended his complaint
from putative class action to a single cause of action for civil penalties under PAGA).
152. Salvatore U. Bonaccorso, State Court Resistance to Federal Arbitration Law, 67 STAN. L.
REV. 1145, 1165 (2015) (“PAGA suits may substitute for regular lawsuits to the extent that their
recovery approaches what they would receive in compensatory damages.”).
153. Janet Cooper Alexander, To Skin a Cat: Qui Tam Actions as a State Legislative Response to
Concepcion, 46 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 1203, 1238 (2013).
154. Arias v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 4th 969, 987 (Cal. 2009).
155. This argument was put forward by the employer in Galarsa v. Dolgen California, LLC, 2021
WL 5411013, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021) and rejected by the court. The employer asserted that the
plaintiff-employee was “patently abusing the PAGA device to avoid her arbitration agreement and is
utilizing the Iskanian rule to frustrate the FAA’s objectives.” Id. The court rejected this argument
and concluded that “pursuing a PAGA representative action instead of arbitrating individual causes
of action is not a device or formula for frustrating the FAA.” Id.
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preemption fate156 because the statute does not in fact make the state the only
real party in interest in a PAGA action. As one California state court noted:
[T]here are different ways of viewing a qui tam lawsuit regarding the
true claim owner and whether the state and the employee can both be
considered to be real parties in interest in the lawsuit for purposes of
evaluating an employee’s authority to waive rights to bring claims in
court.157
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has found that a PAGA action is not a
“traditional” qui tam action.158 First, “PAGA explicitly involves the
interests of others besides California and the plaintiff employee—it also
implicates the interests of nonparty aggrieved employees.”159 PAGA
therefore “creates an interest in penalties, not only for California and the
plaintiff employee, but for nonparty employees as well.”160 According to the
Ninth Circuit, this feature of PAGA “conflicts with qui tam’s underlying
assignment theory—that the real interest is the government’s, which the
government assigns to a private citizen to prosecute on its behalf.” 161
Second, “PAGA represents a permanent, full assignment of California’s
interest to the aggrieved employee” and “once California elects not to issue a
citation, the State has no authority under PAGA to intervene in a case
brought by an aggrieved employee.”162 In contrast, a traditional qui tam
action “acts only as ‘a partial assignment’ of the Government’s claim” and
the government “remains the real party in interest throughout the litigation
156. Correia v. NB Baker Electric, Inc., 32 Cal. App. 5th 602, 609 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019) (“We are
aware the federal courts have reached a different conclusion regarding the arbitrability of a PAGA
representative claim, but find these decisions unpersuasive because the courts did not fully consider
the implications of the qui tam nature of a PAGA claim on the enforceability of an employeremployee arbitration agreement.”). See also Mathew Andrews, Whistling in Silence: The
Implications of Arbitration on Qui Tam Claims under the False Claims Act, 15 PEPP. DISP. RESOL.
L. J. 203, 207 (2015) (arguing with respect to the federal False Claims Act that “qui tam claims are
arbitrable under prevailing Supreme Court precedent”)
157. Correia, 32 Cal. App. 5th at 624.
158. Magadia v. Wal-Mart Assoc., Inc., 999 F.3d 668, 675 (9th Cir. 2021) (noting that this case
did not involve an arbitration agreement, but concerned the plaintiff-employee’s Article III standing
to bring a representative PAGA claim); see also Nanavati v. Adecco USA, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 3d 1072,
1082–83 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (distinguishing a representative PAGA claim from qui tam actions in the
context of enforcing an arbitration agreement).
159. Magadia, 999 F.3d at 676.
160. Id. The court also stated that “[w]hile California may be a ‘real party in interest,’ a PAGA
suit also implicates the interests of other third parties.” Id. at 676–77 (internal citations omitted).
161. Id. at 676.
162. Id. at 677.
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and ‘may take complete control of the case if it wishes.’” 163 The Ninth
Circuit accordingly concluded that:
PAGA prevents California from intervening in a suit brought by the
aggrieved employee, yet still binds the State to whatever judgment
results. A complete assignment to this degree—an anomaly among
modern qui tam statutes—undermines the notion that the aggrieved
employee is solely stepping into the shoes of the State rather than
also vindicating the interests of other aggrieved employees.164
The fact that employees bringing PAGA claims are vindicating, at least
in part, their own interests seems fatal to the California state courts’
reasoning. If a PAGA action is not a traditional qui tam action brought
solely on behalf of the state, much of Iskanian’s justification for holding that
it falls outside the scope of the FAA disappears. The lower state courts’
reasoning that a plaintiff-employee cannot bind a state to a “predispute”
arbitration agreement to which the state is not a party also unravels if the
plaintiff-employee is bringing the PAGA claims also in his or her own right
and not only on behalf of the state. It is certainly true that the FAA “does
not purport to place any restriction on a nonparty’s choice of a judicial
forum”165 and it is indeed “difficult to see how a private individual could
contract away the state’s right to enforce its law.”166 But striking down the
Iskanian rule does not place any restriction on the state’s right to enforce its
law. Where the state pursues an employee’s claim against an employer for
Labor Code violations, it remains unbound by any arbitration agreement that
it did not enter into itself.167
163. Id. (internal citations omitted).
164. Id.
165. E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 289 (2002).
166. Alexander, supra note 153, at 1233.
167. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. at 296 (holding that the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission may pursue victim-specific judicial relief in an enforcement action alleging that the
employer has violated the Americans with Disabilities Act notwithstanding an agreement between an
employer and an employee to arbitrate employment-related disputes); Charter Commc’n, Inc., v.
Jewett, 2021 WL 5332121, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. 2021) (holding that the New York State Division of
Human Rights may “prosecute employee-filed complaints of employment discrimination” in a
public hearing notwithstanding an arbitration agreement between the employee and the employer
that covers the discrimination claims); Scalia v. CE Security LLC, 2021 WL 3774198, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. 2021) (holding that the United States Department of Labor may prosecute violations of
the Fair Labor Standards Act notwithstanding an arbitration agreement between the employee and
the employer); NC Fin. Sol. of Utah, LLC v. Commonwealth ex rel. Herring, 299 Va. 452, 461
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However, the situation in the PAGA context is precisely the reverse—it
is not the state vindicating the rights of employees, but rather “aggrieved
employees” vindicating their own rights as well as those of the state by
bringing PAGA claims on the state’s behalf. PAGA itself does not explicitly
state that PAGA claims are pursued by aggrieved employees on behalf of the
state, but rather that such an employee may bring PAGA claims “on behalf
of himself or herself and other current or former employees.”168 Indeed,
such an employee might collect “a greater proportion of potential recoveries
in PAGA-type actions than is the norm in class action settlements.”169
Where the state is not the party enforcing the PAGA statute either on its own
behalf or on behalf of an employee, the “mere involvement of an
administrative agency in the enforcement of a statute is not sufficient to
preclude arbitration.”170
The state’s independent authority to enforce the PAGA statute, then,
remains unfettered by a private arbitration agreement entered into by an
individual employee. But, when the state is authorizing “aggrieved
employees” who have personally suffered from their employers’ Labor Code
violations to bring PAGA claims on its behalf, such employees may do so in
a manner and in a forum of their choosing. A PAGA action is brought by
the plaintiff-employee, is captioned in his or her name only, does not involve
the state’s attorneys, and the plaintiff-employee can unilaterally withdraw
the action at any time, settle it, or choose not to commence it at all.171 In
(2021) (holding that the Virginia The Attorney General, acting on behalf of the Commonwealth, may
enforce the provisions of the Virginia Consumer Protection Act notwithstanding an arbitration
agreement between the defendant and individual consumers).
168. Cal. Lab. Cod. § 2699(a). See also Alexander, supra note153, at 1235 (suggesting that the
PAGA should be framed “more clearly as a traditional qui tam provision in which recovery goes to
the state with an incentive share to the plaintiff, rather than as a private attorney general action in
which a private plaintiff stands in the shoes of the state as parens patriae representing a group”);
Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, The New Qui Tam: A Model for the Enforcement of Group Rights
in a Hostile Era, 98 TEX. L. REV. 489, 520 (2020) (suggesting that statutes such as PAGA should not
have a “relator-injury requirement” because such a requirement “can be read to suggest that the
purpose of the qui tam statute is not entirely public, but rather operates more like a private right of
action, providing an avenue for redress of private harms, even as it also furthers public objectives.
And, if the statute is understood to authorize a lead plaintiff who shares injury in fact with absent
aggrieved persons to pursue redress on their behalf—and distribute lawsuit proceeds to them no
less—it begins to look a lot like a class action.”).
169. Alexander, supra note 153, at 1237–38.
170. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28–29 (1991).
171. Charter Commc’n, Inc., v. Jewett, 2021 WL 5332121, at *10–11 (N.D.N.Y. 2021) (noting
that the situation is the opposite in the case of the New York State Division of Human Rights, which
is why the private arbitration agreement between the employer and the employee “is unlikely to be a
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these circumstances, it is difficult to see how the repudiation of an otherwise
valid and enforceable arbitration agreement covering claims of Labor Code
violations on the basis of a strained application of agency principles could
avoid FAA preemption.
B. The Federal Courts’ Rationale Leads to Preemption
The interpretation of the federal courts in California and the Ninth
Circuit of the Iskanian rule seems less offensive to the FAA because it
allows for arbitration of representative PAGA claims, at least in principle.
These courts have also relied on more traditional reasons for holding that the
Iskanian rule is not preempted by the FAA, focusing on Section 2 of the Act
and on its objectives.172 This approach raises its own difficulties, however,
and ultimately also leads to preemption.
First, the Ninth Circuit’s reliance on Section 2’s “saving clause” may
have been implicitly overruled by the Supreme Court in Epic Systems.173 In
Sakkab, the Ninth Circuit held that the “saving clause” saves the Iskanian
rule from preemption because the rule applies “regardless of whether the
waiver appears in an arbitration agreement or a non-arbitration
agreement.”174 As noted above, in Epic Systems the Supreme Court reversed
a Ninth Circuit decision holding that class action waivers violated the federal
National Labor Relations Act and that this outcome was not preempted by
the FAA.175 The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning was that “[w]hen an illegal
provision not targeting arbitration is found in an arbitration agreement, the
FAA treats the contract like any other; the FAA recognizes a general
contract defense of illegality.”176 The Supreme Court disagreed. The Court
held that even if the illegality defense is applicable to “any contract,” a party
challenging an arbitration agreement cannot rely on a generally applicable

basis on which to effectively bar the NYSDHR, which is not a party to the Agreement, from acting
in accordance with its statutory authority to prosecute the complaint”).
172. Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail N. Am., Inc., 803 F. 3d 425, 433 (9th Cir. 2015) (“We apply
ordinary conflict preemption principles to determine whether a state-law rule conflicts with a federal
statute containing a saving clause.”).
173. See generally Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
174. Sakkab, 803 F. 3d at 432.
175. Epic Systems Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1632.
176. Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975, 985 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2; AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011). The court even relied on Sakkab for this
reasoning. Id.
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defense to target arbitration “either by name or by more subtle methods,
such as by ‘interfer[ing] with fundamental attributes of arbitration.’”177 As a
federal court in California has noted, “[i]f a federal law . . . that applies
regardless of the existence of an arbitration provision does not implicate the
FAA’s saving clause to avoid preemption, presumably a state law . . . that
applies regardless of the existence of an arbitration provision does not
implicate the saving clause either.”178
At the same time, Epic Systems (and Concepcion) may not be fatal to
the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Sakkab if the Iskanian rule does not interfere
with “fundamental attributes of arbitration.”179 In this regard, the Ninth
Circuit found that representative PAGA actions are sufficiently different
from class action so that they do not attack the “individualized nature of the
arbitration proceedings”180 and thereby trigger FAA preemption.181 If
representative PAGA claims are indeed sufficiently different from class
actions, and because the Ninth Circuit (unlike the California state courts)
allows such claims to proceed in arbitration as a matter of principle, the
Iskanian rule may be saved from preemption notwithstanding Supreme
Court precedent. There seems to be merit to the distinction drawn by the
Ninth Circuit between class and PAGA actions, a distinction that has been
applied in non-arbitration contexts as well.
For instance, representative PAGA actions are distinguished from class
actions in the context of federal subject-matter jurisdiction. In several cases
involving removal of representative PAGA actions based on the Class
Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”),182 federal courts have found that they lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction and remanded these actions to the state court. 183
A “class action” is defined by CAFA as “any civil action filed under rule 23
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or similar State statute . . .
authorizing an action to be brought by 1 or more representative persons as a
class action.”184 The question in the context of a representative PAGA
177. Epic Systems Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1622 (internal citations omitted).
178. McGovern v. U.S. Bank N.A., 362 F. Supp. 3d 850, 862 n.5 (S.D. Cal. 2019).
179. Epic Systems Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1622.
180. Id.
181. Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail N. Am., Inc., 803 F. 3d 425, 435–37 (9th Cir. 2015).
182. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).
183. See generally Yocupicio v. PAE Group, LLC, 795 F. 3d 1057, 1060 n.7 (9th Cir. 2015)
(reviewing whether the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and should accordingly remand the
case to state court).
184. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B).
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action is whether PAGA is a “similar State statute” to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 to establish the original jurisdiction of a federal court under
CAFA. Federal courts have answered this question in the negative,185 for
much of the same reasons that they have found PAGA and class actions to
be sufficiently different in the arbitration context:
PAGA has no notice requirements for unnamed aggrieved
employees, nor may such employees opt out of a PAGA action. In
a PAGA action, the court does not inquire into the named plaintiff’s
and class counsel’s ability to fairly and adequately represent
unnamed employees . . . . PAGA contains no requirements of
numerosity, commonality, or typicality. . . . [T]he finality of PAGA
judgments differs distinctly from that of class action judgments. . . .
PAGA expressly provides that employees retain all rights ‘to pursue
or recover other remedies available under state or federal law, either
separately or concurrently with an action taken under this part.’
‘[I]if the employer defeats a PAGA claim, the nonparty employees,
because they were not given notice of the action or afforded an
opportunity to be heard, are not bound by the judgment as to
remedies other than civil penalties.’ . . . The employee’s recovery is
thus an incentive to perform a service to the state, not restitution for
wrongs done to members of the class.186
Yet, these differences between PAGA and class actions may not save
the Iskanian rule from FAA preemption after all. Even if PAGA actions are
distinguishable from class actions, this does not necessarily mean that they
are procedurally identical to individual actions. As Judge Smith noted in his
dissenting opinion in Sakkab, “an arbitrator overseeing a representative
PAGA claim would have to make specific factual determinations regarding
(1) the number of other employees affected by the labor code violations, and
(2) the number of pay periods that each of the affected employees
worked.”187 Such information would have to be obtained through discovery
185. See, e.g., Pineda v. Sun Valley Packing, L.P., 2021 WL 5755586, at *2 (E.D. Cal. 2021)
(citing cases); Echevarria v. Aerotek, Inc., 814 Fed. App’x 321, 322 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding that the
district court correctly determined that CAFA jurisdiction did not apply to the remaining PAGA
claim).
186. Baumann v. Chase Inv. Serv. Corp., 747 F.3d 1117, 1122–23 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal
citations omitted).
187. Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail N. Am., Inc., 803 F.3d 425, 445 (9th Cir. 2015) (Smith, J.,
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that “would be significant and substantially more complex than discovery
regarding only the employee’s individual claims.”188 Finally,
the arbitration of representative PAGA claims greatly increases the
risk to employers. Rather than awarding damages for Labor Code
violations for just one employee, representative PAGA claims
award damages for all affected employees. A representative PAGA
claim could therefore increase the damages awarded in arbitration
by a multiplier of a hundred or thousand times (depending on the
size of the company).189
Ultimately, the fate of the Iskanian rule does not hang on whether
representative PAGA claims survive Concepcion’s and Epic System’s
prohibition on “[r]equiring the availability of classwide arbitration.”190 Even
if the Ninth Circuit’s reasons for salvaging the Iskanian rule from
preemption are accepted—that is, even if the rule applies to “all contracts”
within the meaning of Section 2 of the FAA and does not undermine the
individualized nature of arbitration—the practical outcome of the court’s
reasoning would still result in preemption by the FAA. While the Ninth
Circuit, as well as federal district courts, allow for arbitration of
representative PAGA claims in principle, they have stopped short of
compelling such claims to arbitration in the face of agreements waiving all
“representative claims.” Indeed, because PAGA claims are “representative”
claims, the courts are unable to compel them to arbitration in the face of
such waivers without running afoul of the Supreme Court’s admonition that
arbitration agreements are to be enforced “according to their terms.” 191
Therefore, the outcome of the federal courts’ attempt to reconcile the
Iskanian rule with the FAA is that many arbitration agreements are
compromised where representative PAGA claims are raised or rendered
completely unenforceable where PAGA is the sole cause of action. As
Judge Bumatay recently noted in his concurring opinion in Rivas v. Coverall
North America, Inc., another case involving PAGA and FAA arbitration,
“[w]e now creep closer to the day that a party may always sidestep an
dissenting).
188. Id. at 446–47 (Smith, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 447–48 (Smith, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
190. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011); Epic Systems Corp. v.
Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1631 (2018).
191. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 343–44.
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arbitration agreement simply by filing a PAGA claim.”192 Because the
Iskanian rule, as applied by the federal courts, effectively “requires that the
parties not arbitrate a claim at all,”193 it undermines the FAA’s goal of
enforcing valid arbitration agreements according to their terms and is
therefore preempted by the FAA, at least under current Supreme Court
precedent.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Iskanian rule is unlikely to survive FAA preemption either on the
reasoning of the California Supreme Court in Iskanian or on the subsequent
reasoning of lower California state courts. The suggestion that the FAA
does not apply at all to PAGA claims clearly runs afoul of Concepcion and
cannot be sustained on the basis of the quasi-qui tam nature of PAGA. The
continuous expansion of the meaning of “predispute” arbitration agreements
by state courts and their strained reliance on agency principles ultimately
violates Concepcion as well, leading to FAA preemption of the Iskanian
rule. As for federal courts, while they have attempted to avoid FAA
preemption by explicitly allowing for arbitration of representative PAGA
claims, they have stopped short (as they must) of compelling such claims to
arbitration in the face of agreements that prohibit representative actions.
The result in the federal courts is therefore akin to that in the state courts—
very few PAGA claims, if any, end up in arbitration, notwithstanding the
presence of valid agreements to arbitrate employment-related claims,
including statutory PAGA claims, on an individual basis.
Even if the Iskanian rule’s prohibition on representative PAGA waivers
does not survive FAA preemption, not all is lost in California’s quest to
enforce its Labor Code. The California Supreme Court in Iskanian
considered all PAGA claims to be “representative,”194 but it did not hold that
PAGA claims may not be brought on an individual basis by a plaintiff-

192. Rivas v. Coverall North America, Inc., 842 Fed. App’x 55, 58 (9th Cir. 2021) (Bumatay J.,
concurring). The concurrence further noted that “California courts have already said as much.” Id.
at 58 n.1 (Bumatay J., concurring) (quoting Collie v. Icee Co., 52 Cal. App. 5th 477, 481 (2020).
The concurrence states that this suggests “that an otherwise valid arbitration agreement does not
provide a basis to compel arbitration of a PAGA claim.” Id.
193. Id. at 59 (Bumatay J., concurring).
194. Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L. A., LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348, 384 (Cal. 2014), cert. denied, 574 U.S.
1121 (2015).
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employee.195 It may be less efficient, from a penalty collection perspective,
to prosecute employers’ violations of the Labor Code in an individual
proceeding, be it litigation or arbitration. But, such individual proceedings
still serve to hold employers accountable for Labor Code violations, albeit
one employee at a time, and can faithfully enforce Iskanian’s prohibition of
PAGA waivers “in any forum.”196 To be sure, PAGA claims are “not merely
a private matter” and a PAGA plaintiff “may be likened to a ‘private
attorney general’ protecting the public interest.”197 At the same time,
however, the lack of state oversight over representative PAGA actions
commenced by individual employees opens the door to “private enforcer
misuse” that may undermine PAGA’s public interest in enforcement. 198
Moreover, the PAGA statute:
does not create property rights or any other substantive rights. Nor
does it impose any legal obligations. It is simply a procedural
statute allowing an aggrieved employee to recover civil penalties—
for Labor Code violations—that otherwise would be sought by state
labor law enforcement agencies.199
In any event, current Supreme Court precedent seems to invalidate both
state and federal courts’ jurisprudence in the PAGA saga because “[a] state

195. Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail North America, Inc., 803 F.3d 425, 449 (9th Cir. 2015) (Smith, J.,
dissenting) (“Although the existence of ‘individual’ PAGA claims is disputed, see Reyes v. Macy’s,
Inc., 202 Cal. App. 4th 1119, 1123, 135 Cal.Rptr.3d 832 (2011) (holding that a PAGA claimant may
not bring an individual PAGA claim), the Iskanian court expressly chose not to decide the issue.”).
196. Iskanian, 59 Cal. 4th at 360. For instance, post-Epic individual plaintiffs have started filing
hundreds or thousands of individual arbitration demands that would have otherwise likely been
pursued as a class action. The same would be possible with PAGA claims. See Gilles & Friedman,
supra note 168, at 534; Tamar Meshel, Mobile-Based Transportation Employment Disputes:
Corporate Chutzpa and the Potential Resurrection of Class Arbitration, 2020 U. CHI. L. REV.
ONLINE 1 (2020).
197. Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 224 (1987) (discussing RICO); see also
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 635 (1985) (regarding
antitrust claims).
198. Andrew Elmore, The State Qui Tam to Enforce Employment Law, 69 DEPAUL L. REV. 357,
361 (2020). Elmore states that “private enforcers may file qui tam claims and resolve them cheaply
in a ‘reverse auction,’ in which plaintiff’s attorneys settle qui tam claims on substandard terms to
avoid being outbid by more pliant plaintiff’s attorneys.” Id. at 401. See also Gilles & Friedman,
supra note 168, at 536 (arguing that “PAGA revenues are artificially—and we believe
monumentally—depressed” by plaintiff lawyers in settlement agreements).
199. Amalgamated Transit Union, Loc. 1756, AFL-CIO v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 4th 993, 1003
(Cal. 2009).
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may not insulate causes of action from arbitration by declaring that the
purposes of the statute can only be satisfied via class, representative, or
collective action. If the rule conflicts with the objectives of the FAA, the
state rule must give way.”200 At bottom, the Iskanian rule conflicts with the
objectives of the FAA because it “prohibits outright the arbitration of a
particular type of claim”201 under the state courts’ reasoning and stands in
the way of enforcing otherwise valid and applicable arbitration agreements
“according to their terms”202 under the federal courts’ reasoning.
To uphold the Iskanian rule, the Supreme Court would have to depart
from its long-standing FAA precedent or create an exception for private
attorney general statutes. Alternatively, the Court could issue a narrow
decision and invalidate the Iskanian rule on the basis of the unique nature of
PAGA, 203 while leaving the door open for other statutes to survive FAA
preemption if, for instance, they make clear that individuals are authorized to
privately vindicate a right that belongs only to the state, avoid a complete
assignment of that right to an individual plaintiff, and allow the state to
retain control over the private representative action. Either way, the impact
of the Supreme Court’s decision on the Iskanian rule is likely to extend
beyond PAGA and California. It will be relevant to the interpretation and
application of the FAA more generally,204 as well as to other private attorney
general statutes that might intersect with the FAA. 205

200. Sakkab, 803 F.3d at 450 (Smith, J., dissenting).
201. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 341 (2011).
202. Id. at 343–44.
203. See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 168, at 523 (noting that the “architecture of [PAGA] . . .
all but begs the current Supreme Court to look past the qui tam provisions as a sort of sheep’s
clothing and locate inside a class action wolf”).
204. See Alexander, supra note 153, at 1233 (stating that whether the Iskanian rule can survive
FAA preemption “raise[s] grave federalism concerns”).
205. See, e.g., Federal False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729; Oregon Unlawful Trade Practices Act,
O.R.S. § 646.638; New York Wage Theft Prevention Act, N.Y. LAB. LAW § 215; see also,
Alexander, supra note153, at 1234–35 (suggesting that “[s]tatutes regulating unfair competition,
insurance, environmental protection, and other subjects where contracts of adhesion are common”
“could be amended to provide a statutory penalty for violations and to authorize private attorney
general or qui tam actions similar to those in PAGA.”); Elmore, supra note 198, at 359 (noting
“seven states—Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, Vermont, and
Washington—[that] have contemplated qui tam statutes” modeled after the California PAGA);
Elizabeth J. Kennedy, Deputizing the Frontline: Enforcing Workplace Rights in a Post-Pandemic
Economy, 38 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 203, 241 (2021) (noting that “[t]hirty-one states have a
version of the federal False Claims Act”).
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